

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

**Superior Court of Washington
County of Thurston**

American Property Casualty Insurance Association, Professional Insurance Agents of Washington, and Independent Insurance Agents and Brokers of Washington,

Appellant,

vs.

State of Washington ex. Rel. Washington State Office of the Insurance Commissioner; Mike Kreidler, in his official capacity as Commissioner of Insurance,

Respondents.

No. 22-2-00180-34

Amicus Curiae Brief of the Consumer Federation of America, Northwest Justice Project, and Northwest Consumer Law Center in Support of Respondent and Washington Regulation R2021-07—Temporary Prohibition of Use of Credit History for Three Years After Conclusion of Public Emergency

The Consumer Federation of America (“CFA”), Northwest Justice Project (“NJP”), and Northwest Consumer Law Center (“NWCLC”) submit this brief to the Thurston County Superior Court to assist the Court in resolving the lawsuit filed against the Washington State Office of the Insurance Commissioner regarding Regulation R2021-07—Temporary Prohibition of Use of Credit History for Three Years After Conclusion of Public Emergency. This regulation is a necessary and proper response to the COVID-19 pandemic and its resulting impact on Washington drivers. This temporary prohibition on the use of credit history to determine rates for private passenger automobile coverage, renter’s coverage, and homeowner’s coverage is

1 necessary to address the unfair discrimination caused by the impact of the pandemic and related
2 public policy responses on consumer credit histories, as well as the pandemic's amplification of
3 racial disparities caused by the use of credit history in insurance underwriting, pricing, and other
4 practices.

5 As will be illustrated through the stories of actual Washington residents below, NJP
6 advocates have noticed a sharp increase in pandemic-related unsecured credit defaults resulting
7 in litigation filed by both original creditors and debt buyers. NJP regularly provides direct
8 representation to clients who become defendants in debt collection lawsuits. Even though many
9 of NJP's clients are collection-proof (meaning they have no income or assets above
10 Washington's exemptions for bank or wage garnishment), preventing entry of a judgment is
11 critical to stave off harm from credit-related barriers to housing and food security and other
12 consequences of tarnished credit. In the months preceding drafting of this brief, NJP has assisted
13 hundreds of consumers being sued or sent to collections for defaulted unsecured debt
14 increasingly traceable to 2020 and pandemic related financial hardships.

15 In this brief, we will show that disruptions caused by the pandemic and the resulting
16 public policy responses made the use of credit history by insurers unfairly discriminatory both as
17 an actuarial matter and with respect to protected classes. As such, the rule promulgated by
18 Insurance Commissioner Mike Kreidler is within his statutory authority and in the best interest of
19 Washington consumers.

20 ***Interest of Amici Curiae***

21 CFA is an association of over 250 national, state, and local non-profit consumer
22 organizations founded in 1968 to advance the consumer interest through research, advocacy, and
23 education. We advocate on behalf of consumers throughout the United States, with a special
24

1 focus on the protection of low- and moderate-income consumers. For decades CFA worked on
2 insurance policy under the direction of J. Robert Hunter, an actuary, former Federal Insurance
3 Administrator, former Texas Insurance Commissioner and now CFA's Insurance Director
4 Emeritus. CFA's current Director of Insurance, Douglas Heller, serves as a member of the
5 United States Department of the Treasury's Federal Advisory Committee on Insurance and as a
6 Public Member of the California Automobile Assigned Risk Plan Advisory Board. CFA's
7 Research and Advocacy Associate Michael DeLong serves as a member of the Nevada Division
8 of Insurance's Property and Casualty Advisory Committee and as a funded Consumer
9 Representative with the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC). CFA
10 collects, analyzes, and synthesizes data from a wide variety of sources, including public records,
11 vendors of insurance industry data, and insurers themselves. CFA has issued numerous reports
12 on the issues of credit history in insurance, auto insurance affordability, and unfair
13 discrimination in insurance markets.¹

14 As a result of our research and analysis, CFA advocates in legislative and regulatory
15 proceedings for consumer protection-oriented reforms and rules such as the protections
16 established by Regulation R2021-07. Finally, CFA has submitted numerous amicus briefs before
17 state and federal courts on insurance and other topics. As we describe herein, if this regulation is
18 not permitted, consumers will be subject to unfair discrimination, which is prohibited by
19 Washington law. Our organization therefore has a direct interest in this regulation and this case,
20 both of which relate directly to and impact our work protecting consumers.

21 Northwest Justice Project is a not-for-profit organization that provides free civil legal
22 services to low-income people throughout the state of Washington to address fundamental

23
24 ¹ See <https://consumerfed.org/cfa-studies-on-the-plight-of-low-and-moderate-income-good-drivers-in-affording-state-required-auto-insurance/> for a list of CFA auto insurance studies.

1 human needs such as housing, family safety, income security, health care, education, and more.
2 In 2021 alone, Northwest Justice Project provided legal assistance to thousands of low-income
3 Washingtonians, many of whom were facing consumer and debt collection issues and general
4 economic hardship. NJP's work challenges structural and racial inequities to promote the long-
5 term well-being of low-income individuals, families and communities statewide. Economic
6 discrimination in insurance rates negatively affects NJP's clients by creating an unfair system
7 that forces people with less to pay more, reinforcing the cycle of poverty. NJP endorses and has
8 signed onto the Race, Equity & Justice Initiative ("REJI") and is committed to combatting the
9 effects of systemic racism in the lives of our clients and in their communities. Due to the
10 undeniable link between race and poverty, any policy that discriminates based on credit
11 worthiness correspondingly results in a disparate impact on communities of color.

12 Northwest Consumer Law Center is a Washington nonprofit organization dedicated to
13 advancing economic justice. Since opening its doors in January 2013, NWCLC has served over
14 4,000 low-income Washington consumers. NWCLC engages in education and outreach to low-
15 income Washington consumers about credit reporting and also provides legal representation to
16 consumers facing unfair and discriminatory credit reporting practices. As such, NWCLC and its
17 clients have an interest in the fair development and application of Washington laws affecting
18 credit reporting and unfair discrimination stemming from credit reporting.

19 **Summary of Argument**

20 On February 1, 2022, the Washington State Office of the Insurance Commissioner
21 ("OIC") approved Regulation R2021-07, which temporarily prohibits insurance companies from
22 using credit history to determine personal insurance rates, premiums, or eligibility for coverage
23 in the cases of private passenger automobile insurance, renter's insurance, and homeowner's
24

1 insurance. The Thurston County Superior Court granted a temporary stay of the new rule on
2 February 25, 2022, and scheduled a hearing for July 8, 2022.

3 This rule is based on the determination by the OIC that the application of a credit-based
4 insurance score in the midst and eventual wake of the COVID-19 pandemic and the resulting
5 economic impact results in unfair discrimination in the personal lines insurance marketplace.
6 R2021-07 will remain in effect for three years after the end of the national emergency
7 concerning the COVID-19 outbreak declared by the President of the United States on March 13,
8 2020 or three years after the date the Washington Governor’s proclamation of a State of
9 Emergency expires, whichever is later.²

10 In order to provide critical context for the public interest in preserving this regulation, our
11 brief begins with important background information describing the use of credit history in
12 insurance markets, with a specific focus on its use in auto insurance pricing, and illustrating how
13 credit-based insurance scores result in drivers with clean driving records paying significantly
14 higher premiums than similarly situated drivers when their credit-based scores are lower than
15 other policyholders. We then show how the pandemic, its resulting economic impacts, and
16 government responses make this practice unfairly discriminatory, and why Regulation R2021-07
17 not only complies with Washington law and is within the authority of the OIC, but is necessary
18 to prevent insurers from charging insurance premiums that violate the state law governing unfair
19 discrimination.

20 **Background on the Use and Impact of Credit History in Washington’s Insurance Market**
21 **as Context for Understanding the Necessity of Regulation**

22 In order to understand the reasons why the use of credit history can be deemed *unfairly*
23 discriminatory – and the regulation justifiable – due to the current pandemic-influenced

24 ² <https://www.insurance.wa.gov/sites/default/files/documents/r2021-07-cr-103.pdf>.

1 conditions, it is important to first describe how credit history is used to discriminate among
 2 consumers. While our discussion here focuses on auto insurance prices, the practice is much the
 3 same in homeowner’s and renter’s insurance, as well as in the underwriting practices of insurers.
 4 In the underwriting context, the worse one’s credit history report is, the more likely they will be
 5 labelled ineligible for coverage or shunted to a more expensive affiliate insurer. Furthermore,
 6 while insurers argue that they use “credit-based insurance scores” instead of traditional “credit
 7 scores,” both are derived from the same credit histories compiled by the same credit bureaus and
 8 converted to their respective scores using similar statistical techniques. The difference among
 9 different types of scores – auto insurance, home insurance, auto loan, mortgage loans – is the
 10 application of the product, not the raw material used to develop the scores. For example, one
 11 leading scoring firm – FICO – describes the contents of its credit score³ and insurance score⁴ as
 12 follows:

Credit Score	Insurance Score
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Payment history (35%), • Amounts owed (30%), • Length of credit history (15%), • New credit (10%), and • Credit mix (10%). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Previous credit performance (40%), • Current level of indebtedness (30%), • Length of credit history (15%), • New credit/Pursuit of new credit (10%), and • Types of credit used (5%).

18
 19 The following states prohibit the use of credit history for personal lines insurance
 20 underwriting and rating: California, Hawaii, and Massachusetts prohibit it in auto insurance
 21 transactions and California, Maryland, and Massachusetts prohibit its use in their home insurance
 22 markets. These prohibitions predate and are not linked to the pandemic or its effects.

23
 24 ³ See <https://www.myfico.com/credit-education/whats-in-your-credit-score>, retrieved on April 20th, 2022.

⁴ See <https://insurancescores.fico.com/InScore>, retrieved on April 20th, 2022.

How Credit History Impacts Auto Insurance Premiums in Washington State

Earlier this month NJP represented Jane Doe 1 (JD1) (name withheld for personal privacy) in a debt buyer lawsuit seeking entry of a judgment on pandemic related defaulted credit card debt. JD1 is a 41-year-old Black single mother of three children who lives in Eastern Washington. She has been steadily employed her entire adult life, but like an increasing number of Americans, lives paycheck to paycheck. In March 2020, JD1 lost her job due to pandemic-related closures. Despite the pandemic government assistance, JD1 had to make a difficult choice -- one familiar to the increasing ranks of Washingtonians whose income fails to keep pace with living expenses: she had to assign each bill a degree of urgency. Failure to pay rent would see her evicted. Failure to pay utilities might see her electricity and water cut off. Failure to pay her auto insurance would be unlawful and impose unfair risks on her and other drivers. Failure to budget for food would cause her family to go hungry. Employing this form of poverty triage, she missed the monthly payment on her unsecured credit card. This was the first time JD1 had ever missed a payment on the account, and she had a credit score in the 700's. Almost immediately, she noticed her score decline by 74 points. Within a month, she got notice from her auto insurance carrier that her monthly rate was increasing by approximately 43% from \$70 per month to \$130. JD1 has never made a claim against any auto insurance policy and has a clean driving record. She was surprised at the sudden increase, since she had no change in driving record or other circumstance that would be reasonably related to her risk as a driver. She called her insurance carrier, which provided no explanation for the sudden jump (but agreed to a "reduced" increase to \$112 per month). For JD1, already budgeting to the penny each month, the increased cost of auto insurance remains a substantial financial hardship.

1 In Washington State, insurers use credit history to determine premiums for consumers
2 such that consumers with the best credit-based insurance scores pay lower rates and consumers
3 with worse scores pay increasingly higher rates. In the auto insurance context, this pattern occurs
4 even when consumers have perfect driving records and no history of filing claims and are
5 otherwise similarly situated except for their personal credit history. In fall 2020, CFA acquired
6 from Quadrant Information Services, LLC data on auto insurance premiums charged by ten of
7 the largest auto insurers for every ZIP code in the United States. Quadrant’s premium data are
8 sourced directly from auto insurers or from the public filings submitted to insurance departments.
9 CFA analyzed the premium data for Washington State and found that insurers charge consumers
10 dramatically different premiums based solely on their credit history.

11 To purchase the state-mandated minimum limits, liability-only auto insurance in
12 Washington State, consumers with excellent credit-based insurance scores and a perfect driving
13 record pay an average statewide annual premium of \$468.09. But if those exact same consumers
14 have fair credit, their average annual premium increases to \$632.96—a 35% or \$165 increase. If,
15 instead, those clean-record drivers have poor credit, their average annual premium rises to
16 \$838.06—a 79% or \$370 increase compared to consumers with excellent credit.⁵

17 Table 1 below shows the average statewide premiums charged by ten of the largest auto
18 insurers in Washington State based on policyholders’ credit history as of August 2020. Table 2
19 shows the percentage increases by insurer, based on credit history.

22 ⁵ “Insurance Companies Charge 79% More to Safe Drivers in Washington State Due to Low Credit Scores; State
23 Farm Nearly Triples Premium for Good Drivers with Credit Problems.” January 12, 2021. Consumer Federation of
24 America. Available at https://consumerfed.org/press_release/insurance-companies-charge-79-more-to-safe-drivers-in-washington-state-due-to-low-credit-scores-state-farm-nearly-triples-premium-for-good-drivers-with-credit-problems/.

Table 1: Auto Insurance Premiums Charged by Largest Washington Insurers Based on Credit History

Auto Insurer	Average Premium Charged For Drivers With Excellent Credit	Average Premium Charged for Drivers With Fair Credit	Average Premium Charged for Drivers with Poor Credit
Allstate	\$679.22	\$956.89	\$1,282.17
American Family	\$551.89	\$644.50	\$751.99
Enumclaw	\$560.21	\$652.06	\$873.15
GEICO	\$400.42	\$512.62	\$547.63
Mid Century	\$836.87	\$1,047.61	\$1,293.31
PEMCO	\$264.98	\$445.53	\$748.63
Progressive	\$311.87	\$519.97	\$648.60
Standard	\$529.19	\$723.67	\$981.35
State Farm	\$293.01	\$495.24	\$833.84
USAA	\$253.21	\$331.52	\$419.89
Average Premium	\$468.09	\$632.96	\$838.06

The data are based on rates for state minimum liability coverage—25/50/10—in effect as of August 2020 and are representative of publicly sourced data using the following driver profile. The driver profile for this information is a 35-year-old, unmarried driver with a license for 19 years and a perfect driving record. The driver has a high school diploma, rents their home, and drives a 2011 Honda Civic LX on a 12 mile commute, 5 days per week, for a total of 12,000 miles per year.

Table 2: Auto Insurance Premium Percentage Increases Charged By Largest Washington Insurers Based on Credit History

Auto Insurer	Percentage Premium Increase from Excellent to Fair	Percentage Premium Increase from Fair to Poor	Percentage Premium Increase from Excellent to Poor
Allstate	41%	34%	89%
American Family	17%	17%	36%
Enumclaw	16%	34%	56%
GEICO	28%	7%	37%
Mid Century	25%	23%	55%
PEMCO	68%	68%	183%
Progressive	67%	25%	108%
Standard	37%	36%	85%
State Farm	69%	68%	185%
USAA	31%	27%	66%
Overall Premium Increase	35%	32%	79%

All of the largest auto insurers impose a credit penalty on their drivers. Even the smallest credit penalty, levied by American Family, forces consumers with clean driving records but only fair credit to pay premiums that are 17% higher than those with excellent credit, and drivers with

1 poor credit to pay premiums that are 36% higher compared to those with excellent credit. The
2 other insurers impose larger credit penalties. The most severe penalty among the carriers in our
3 dataset was imposed by State Farm, which required consumers with fair credit to pay premiums
4 that are 68% higher and consumers with poor credit to pay premiums that are 185% higher
5 compared to those with excellent credit.

6 In many individual ZIP codes, credit history results in staggering impacts on consumers.
7 In the ZIP code 98118, in Seattle, consumers with a perfect driving record and excellent credit
8 pay an average premium of \$663.65. Consumers with the same driving record but fair credit pay
9 an average premium of \$909.80. And consumers with poor credit pay an average premium of
10 \$1,211.55—almost \$550 more than consumers with excellent credit, *on average*.

11 In 2015, Consumer Reports conducted a similar study on auto insurance premiums and
12 credit history. They found that the average premium for full coverage for a Washington driver
13 with a perfect driving record but poor credit was \$2,563. This was \$1,536 more expensive than
14 the same coverage cost a driver with the same driving record but excellent credit. Shockingly,
15 Consumer Reports found that the average premium for a driver with excellent credit and a drunk
16 driving conviction on their record was \$690 less than the premium charged to the customer with
17 poor credit but a clean record.⁶

18 **The Use of Credit History Disproportionately Harms People of Color**

19 Jane Doe 2 “JD2” (name withheld for personal privacy), a 44-year-old Native American
20 and Black single mother living in the Puget Sound area, and another client of NJP, saw her auto
21 insurance rates increase after defaulting on a credit card. At the time the pandemic struck, JD2
22 was on family medical leave from a job at which she had worked for over five years. Her

23
24 ⁶ “The Secret Score Behind Your Rates.” Consumer Reports. July 30, 2015. Available at
<https://www.consumerreports.org/cro/car-insurance/credit-scores-affect-auto-insurance-rates/index.htm>.

1 position became a pandemic casualty, and once her leave ended, she became unemployed. The
2 sudden unexpected loss of income meant she could not meet her regular obligations and could
3 not afford to make her monthly credit card payment. JD2 saw her auto insurance rates increase
4 for no apparent reason. She had not been involved in a collision, cited for any traffic violation, or
5 made any other changes to her policy. The only thing that had changed was a score tied to her
6 credit history.

7 When auto insurers use credit history in their underwriting and pricing, African-
8 American, Latino, and Native American consumers are disproportionately impacted and pay
9 higher premiums. In a November 2021 hearing on the proposed ban on credit history,
10 representatives of the National Association of Mutual Insurance Companies (NAMIC) claimed
11 that “Opposition to insurance scores is not based in facts, science or in mathematics, but in
12 unfounded claims of unfair discrimination. If anything, insurance scores represent the opposite of
13 discrimination.”⁷ However, this argument ignores the data; in fact, there is substantial evidence
14 that credit history’s use results in unfair discrimination and people of color paying substantially
15 more for auto insurance.

16 The 2019 study “The Geography of Subprime Credit” found that “[p]laces with lower
17 credit scores show more signs of economic adversity and reflect patterns of segregation.” The
18 authors also reported a “disproportionate representation of black households in the most
19 subprime neighborhoods.”⁸ Another recent study by the Urban Institute found that median credit
20 scores reveal persistent racial disparities and discrimination, and, therefore, median credit scores
21

22 ⁷ Public Hearing – R2021.07. Office of the Insurance Commissioner, Washington State. November 23, 2021.
Transcript. Pg. 30.

23 ⁸ “Mortgage Market Conditions and Borrower Outcomes: Evidence from the 2012 HMDA Data and Matched
24 HMDA-Credit Record Data.” By Neil Bhutta, Shira Stolarsky, and Madura Watanagase. (Table 14a) Federal
Reserve Bulletin Vol. 99, No. 4. November 2013. Available at
https://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/2013/pdf/2012_hmda.pdf.

1 for white Americans are significantly higher than median credit scores for African-Americans,
2 Hispanic Americans, and Native Americans.⁹ According to Federal Reserve data published in
3 2013, the average credit score for white Americans is 734, while the average score for African-
4 Americans is 677, and the average score for Hispanic/Latino Americans is 701. 5.4% of white
5 Americans have a credit score below 620 (meaning a significant penalty), while 21.3% of
6 African-Americans and 11.2% of Hispanic/Latino Americans have a credit score below that
7 level.¹⁰

8 These credit disparities are connected to systemic biases encountered by Black, Native
9 American, and Latino consumers, as well as structural obstacles to achieving financial stability
10 for these consumers. When auto insurers use credit history to assemble credit-based insurance
11 scores for underwriting and rating auto insurance, the result is higher auto insurance premiums
12 for Black, Native American, and Latino drivers with perfect safety records. The very 2007
13 Federal Trade Commission report on credit-based insurance scores that insurers cite in the public
14 hearing on this regulation¹¹ acknowledges this fact: as illustrated in Figure 12 of that report –
15 “Distribution of Scores by Race and Ethnicity, After Controlling for Age, Gender, and
16 Neighborhood Income” – credit-based insurance scores for African-Americans and Hispanics
17 are not evenly distributed but weighted heavily toward the lower scores that result in higher
18 premiums, while scores for Non-Hispanic Whites and Asians are more evenly distributed though
19 with a higher percentage having the highest scores and lowest premiums than the opposite.¹²

21 ⁹ “Credit Health During the COVID-19 Pandemic.” Urban Institute. February 25, 2021. Available at
22 <https://apps.urban.org/features/credit-health-during-pandemic/>.

23 ¹⁰ Bhutta, N., & Canner, G. B. (2013). Mortgage market conditions and borrower outcomes: Evidence from the
24 2012 HMDA data and matched HMDA-credit record data. *Federal Reserve Bulletin*, 99(4).

¹¹ “Public Hearing—R2021-07.” Office of the Insurance Commissioner, Washington State. November 23, 2021. Pg.
30.

¹² “Credit-Based Insurance Scores: Impacts on Consumers of Automobile Insurance.” Federal Trade Commission.
2007. Available at <https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/credit-based-insurance-scores-impacts->

1 **Argument in Support of Regulation R2021-07**

2 Under Washington law, “Premium rates for insurance shall not be excessive, inadequate,
3 or unfairly discriminatory.”¹³ It is the duty and obligation of the Commissioner to enforce this
4 provision.

5 The first two elements of this statute requiring that insurance not be excessive or
6 inadequate are meant to avoid windfall profits (excessive) or insurers being unable to pay claims
7 (inadequate). The third element requires that insurers’ practices—underwriting, pricing, claims
8 settlement—are not unfairly discriminatory. Unfair discrimination should be understood in two
9 ways: the first is actuarial—consumers in similar situations must be treated similarly. This means
10 there must be a valid statistical and actuarial basis for treating consumers differently for
11 insurance underwriting, pricing, and claims settlement. The second kind of unfair discrimination
12 is protected class discrimination—for example, discriminating on the basis of race, ethnicity,
13 religion, or national origin, regardless of any actuarial basis.

14 As the background above indicates, there is substantial evidence that any use of credit
15 history, under any economic circumstances and regardless of a state of emergency, results in
16 unfair discrimination in insurance markets. But it is not necessary to reach that broad conclusion
17 to uphold this regulation, because the rule is not a complete prohibition on the use of credit.
18 Instead, this regulation is a time-limited response to the fact that the pandemic’s unusual
19 circumstances have made credit-based insurance scoring unfairly discriminatory for reasons
20 particular to this public health emergency.

21
22
23 [consumers-automobile-insurance-report-congress-federal-trade/p044804facta_report_credit-
based_insurance_scores.pdf](https://www.federalreserve.gov/consumers-automobile-insurance-report-congress-federal-trade/p044804facta_report_credit-based_insurance_scores.pdf).

24 ¹³ RCW 48.19.020.

1 Below we explain why the regulation is needed to combat the way the pandemic has
2 resulted in both types of unfair discrimination stemming from the use of credit history by
3 insurers.

4 **Government Responses to the COVID-19 Pandemic Have Compromised Credit Data and**
5 **Made Credit-Based Insurance Scores Unfairly Discriminatory**

6 The COVID-19 pandemic has had a dramatic impact on consumers, leading to many
7 businesses closing, workers becoming unemployed, and people curtailing their driving. Many
8 Washington State residents lost their jobs and saw a decline in their earnings, and therefore
9 struggled to pay their bills; failure to make payments is one key factor that will cause declines in
10 credit. At the same time, the number of vehicle miles traveled, auto crashes, and insurance
11 claims filed fell drastically due to stay-at-home orders and closures. Traditionally, auto insurers
12 claim that credit history is an accurate predictor of risk in auto insurance because consumers with
13 better credit histories are, allegedly, more reliable and less risky to insure. Over the past two
14 years, credit history has become completely separated from that theoretical connection to risk—
15 this is both due to the CARES Act passed by Congress and to the pandemic’s impact on
16 consumers.

17 In spring 2020, as the pandemic spread, Congress, Washington State, and local
18 governments swung into action to help consumers, businesses, and communities. Among other
19 protections, these actions gave consumers opportunities to avoid the negative credit impacts that
20 would normally accrue due to certain personal financial actions, such as missing a mortgage
21 payment or failing to pay an auto loan.

22 While this relief was essential and beneficial, it had the effect of making the use of credit-
23 based insurance scores unfairly discriminatory from a similarly-situated (actuarial) perspective.

1 This is because the CARES Act contains a requirement for credit bureaus to report any borrower
2 who has received some form of forbearance by a lender as current on their loan while continuing
3 to report late payments by borrowers who also did not make payment but did not receive formal
4 forbearance.¹⁴

5 Forbearance can take a number of different forms, including permitting borrowers to miss
6 required payments without penalty. Millions of borrowers have taken advantage of forbearance,
7 but millions more who were eligible for forbearance did not seek this assistance. The Urban
8 Institute’s Housing Finance Policy Center has tracked forbearance activity, which peaked at
9 6.4% of the tens of millions of loans insured or owned by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.¹⁵ The
10 Urban Institute concluded that homeowners in neighborhoods of color were less likely to use or
11 access forbearance protections.¹⁶ The Brookings Institution reported that a survey of low and
12 moderate income homeowners found 40% of respondents were unaware of forbearance
13 programs.¹⁷

14 It is straightforward to show how the CARES Act provisions lead to unfair discrimination
15 with credit-based insurance scores. Consider two similarly-situated consumers—identical in all
16 respects, including missing several monthly mortgage payments—but one has sought and
17 obtained forbearance while the other has not. Although similarly situated, the credit report of the
18 consumer who did not get forbearance shows a delinquency while the credit report of the

19 _____
20 ¹⁴ “Statement on Supervisory and Enforcement Practices Regarding the Fair Credit Reporting Act and Regulation V
in Light of the CARES Act.” Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection. April 1, 2020. Pg. 2. Available at
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_credit-reporting-policy-statement_cares-act_2020-04.pdf.

21 ¹⁵ “Housing Finance at a Glance: A Monthly Chartbook.” Urban Institute. February 2021. Available at
<https://www.urban.org/research/publication/housing-finance-glance-monthly-chartbook-february-2021>.

22 ¹⁶ “Delinquent Homeowners in Neighborhoods of Color Are Less Likely to Be Protected by Forbearance.” Michael
Neal and Caitlyn Young. Urban Institute. December 2, 2020. Available at <https://www.urban.org/urban-wire/delinquent-homeowners-neighborhoods-color-are-less-likely-be-protected-forbearance>.

23 ¹⁷ “Low to Moderate-Income Families are Losing Ground: How to Save Their Homeownership Dreams.” Makada
Henry-Nickle, Tim Lucas, Radha Seshagiri, and Samantha Elizondo. Brookings Institute. June 24, 2021. Available
24 at <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/how-we-rise/2021/06/24/working-class-families-are-losing-ground-how-to-save-their-homeownership-dreams/>.

1 consumer who got forbearance shows no delinquency. Pre-pandemic, both consumers would
2 have suffered higher premiums due to delinquencies lowering the credit-based insurance scores.
3 Post-pandemic insurance credit scoring will cause the first consumer (who got no forbearance) to
4 be charged more because of a lower credit score even though the consumers are similarly
5 situated, a hallmark of unfair discrimination in insurance.

6 Furthermore, on an actuarial basis, the ability of consumer credit information to predict
7 claims has been severely harmed. Economic conditions changed during and after March 2020.
8 Unemployment skyrocketed as businesses were shuttered and certain industries—such as
9 personal services, travel, and tourism—were especially impacted. Predictive models, including
10 credit-based insurance scoring models, are developed based on historical data—the data are
11 mined to see what factors are most predictive of a particular outcome. If the training data are
12 biased, incorrect, incomplete, or, as with the current situation, unrepresentative of the future
13 experience, the model will reflect and perpetuate the bias in the data. In the case of insurance
14 credit scoring, historical data will not reflect the current and near future credit experience of
15 many consumers who have been laid off, whose businesses have closed, or who have major
16 medical bills or lost family income after a death due to COVID-19, among other reasons.

17 Stated simply, even if one assumed that insurance credit scoring had a sound actuarial
18 basis prior to March 2020,¹⁸ it is clear that the actuarial basis no longer held after March 2020.

19 Regulation R2021-07 is necessary to block the actuarial unfair discrimination resulting
20 from pandemic-related laws and practices that undermine the validity of credit-based insurance
21 scoring models.

22
23
24 ¹⁸ The authors of this brief do not make that assumption.

1 **The Unfair Discrimination Based on Protected Class Status Resulting From Credit-Based**
2 **Insurance Scores Has Increased Due to the Pandemic**

3 While hardships caused by the COVID-19 pandemic have affected almost all Americans,
4 some have been impacted far more than others. Black and Hispanic households have been far
5 more likely to contract COVID-19 and to suffer from lost income or face housing insecurity due
6 to the pandemic; the Joint Center for Housing Studies at Harvard University also reports that
7 “minority homeowners were also less likely to receive a deferment than white homeowners.”¹⁹
8 This means that the credit relief offered either by state or federal laws, or voluntary actions of
9 credit reporting private entities, provided less protection to the credit histories of Black, Latino,
10 and Native Americans during the pandemic. For consumers who did receive protection and
11 avoided some negative reports, phasing out of deferments and credit reporting moratoria will hit
12 credit histories of communities of color harder, as these communities experience higher levels of
13 job loss and face increased likelihood of foreclosure and eviction. Without this regulation, as the
14 impact of COVID-19 on credit histories plays out inequitably in society over the next several
15 years, insurers’ use of credit history during that period will worsen the racial disparities already
16 inherent in credit-based insurance scoring.

17 The regulation is necessary to address the disproportionate financial harm that the
18 pandemic has caused in communities of color that will exacerbate the racial disparities
19 associated with credit-based insurance scores.

20
21 **The Commissioner Has the Authority and Responsibility to Stop Unfair Discrimination on**
22 **Credit-Based Insurance Scores Caused by the Pandemic**

23 ¹⁹ “A Triple Pandemic? The Economic Impacts of COVID-19 Disproportionately Affect Black and Hispanic
24 Households.” Sharon Cornelissen and Alexander Hermann. Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University.
July 7, 2020. Available at <https://www.jchs.harvard.edu/blog/a-triple-pandemic-the-economic-impacts-of-covid-19-disproportionately-affect-black-and-hispanic-households>.

1 The COVID-19 pandemic has caused widespread harm in society and the economy.
2 Workers lost their jobs, businesses closed or reduced hours, and many consumers have fallen
3 behind on payments. In theory, consumer credit history provides insurers with a measurement of
4 customers' relative risk level, but this link has always been tenuous and the pandemic has
5 completely severed any connection. It is neither logical nor just for consumers to be charged
6 higher insurance premiums because of poor credit if their credit has declined due to a once-in-a-
7 century pandemic. Nor should other consumers with similar risk profiles get lower rates simply
8 because the pandemic did not harm their credit, or they were able to obtain certain tools to mask
9 their credit risk.

10 Additionally, as consumer credit protections enacted during the pandemic expire, the
11 volume of negative credit corrections will continue to increase. A fall 2021 survey conducted by
12 National Public Radio, the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, and the Harvard T.H. Chan
13 School of Public Health found that:

- 14
- 15 • 38% of households across America reported facing serious financial problems in the past
16 few months;
- 17 • 19% of households reported losing all their savings during the COVID-19 pandemic and
18 not currently having any savings to fall back on;
- 19 • At the time the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's eviction ban expired, 27%
20 of renters reported they had serious problems paying their rent in the past few months;
- 21
- 22
- 23
- 24

- 1 • 24% of employed adults reported they have a worse job situation now compared to before
2 the pandemic.²⁰

3
4 As previously mentioned, federal, state, and local governments took sweeping action to
5 help people impacted by the pandemic. Despite all these efforts, at the end of 2021, tens of
6 millions of Americans were still experiencing serious financial hardship. According to the
7 Household Pulse Survey, in October 2021 nearly twenty million adults lived in households that
8 did not get enough to eat, twelve million adult were behind on paying their rent, and 29% of all
9 adults reported it was somewhat or very difficult for them to cover usual expenses in the past
10 week.²¹ Since then, many consumer protections and pandemic aid efforts have expired, placing
11 further burdens on struggling consumers.

12 Washington State is not alone in its response to credit history’s use in insurance. In
13 response to the current situation, in December 2020 the Nevada Division of Insurance adopted
14 Regulation R087-20-Adverse Credit Based Rescoring, which temporarily prohibits the use of
15 credit information to determine insurance rates.²² The New York State Department of Finance
16 Services has also issued a data call about the use of credit history in insurance pricing and
17 whether this factor is unfairly discriminatory toward protected classes of consumers.²³

18 The Washington State Office of the Insurance Commissioner has both the legal
19 responsibility and the authority to stop the unfair discrimination resulting from credit-based

20
21 ²⁰ “Household Experiences in America During the Delta Variant Outbreak.” National Public Radio. October 2021.
Available at <https://media.npr.org/assets/img/2021/10/08/national-report-101221-final.pdf>.

22 ²¹ “The COVID-19 Economy’s Effects on Food, Housing, and Employment Hardships.” Center on Budget and
Policy Priorities. October 2021. Available at <https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/8-13-20pov.pdf>.


23 ²² “Approved Regulation of the Commissioner of Insurance.” LCB File No. R087-20. December 29, 2020. Nevada
Division of Insurance. Available at <https://www.leg.state.nv.us/Register/2020Register/R087-20AP.pdf>.

24 ²³ “NYDFS Examines the Use of Personal Credit Scores in a Changing Regulatory Environment.” By Kara
Bayslinger, Leah Campbell, Matthew J. Gaul, and Allison J. Tam. Law360. March 24, 2022. Available at
<https://www.willkie.com/-/media/files/publications/2022/nydfsexaminestheuseofpersonalcreditscoresinachangi.pdf>.

1 insurance scores during -- and in the wake of -- the COVID-19 public health emergency. This
2 temporary prohibition of the use of credit history in insurance protects the public interest by
3 preventing unfair discrimination in insurance markets while consumers recover from the
4 financial shocks created by the pandemic. Denying the Commissioner his authority to enforce the
5 prohibition against unfair discrimination would undermine the rule of law in Washington State
6 and leave many Washington State residents paying higher insurance premiums than state law is
7 meant to allow.


8 DATED this the 16th day of June, 2022.

10 CONSUMER FEDERATION OF AMERICA
Amicus Curia

11 DocuSigned by:

12 62824AF983464E4...


Kirk D. Miller, WSBA # 40025
13 Local Counsel for Consumer Federation of
14 America

NORTHWEST JUSTICE PROJECT
Amicus Curia

11 DocuSigned by:

12 0A149AF1864749C...

13 Scott M. Kinkley, WSBA # 42434
14 Julia C. Kellison, WSBA # 28885

15 NORTHWEST CONSUMER LAW CENTER
Amicus Curia

16 DocuSigned by:

17 DE9819834B55451...

18 Amanda N. Martin, WSBA # 49581